Enterprise Auto Transport is an owner-operated, federally licensed & bonded nationwide auto transport broker (USDOT #2273104 / MC #774106). All logistics are managed via our central dispatch at (239) 273-4649 — this is our only phone number.
Fraud Prevention
Most auto transport fraud solutions focus on carrier vetting. The real gap is identity: proving the person picking up your car is authorized to take it.
Get a no-obligation quote from Enterprise Auto Transport. Owner-operated, U.S.-based, and licensed with the FMCSA.
Verify before you book
You do not have to take any company's word for it. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration keeps free public records on every licensed broker and carrier in the country. Here is exactly what to ask for and where to verify it:
Every legitimate broker and carrier must provide both on request. Our numbers: USDOT #2273104 and MC #774106. If a company hesitates or deflects, stop.
Go to safer.fmcsa.dot.gov and use the Company Snapshot search. Enter the MC or USDOT number and confirm the legal name, operating status and “Authorized” broker or carrier authority match what you were told.
In the FMCSA Licensing & Insurance portal (li-public.fmcsa.dot.gov), verify the broker's BMC-84 bond or BMC-85 trust fund is active. No active bond means no legal authority to broker your shipment.
If a company says they have a carrier for you but never sends you the carrier's name, DOT/MC number, driver contact and truck details, or you never get to see how much of your payment is going to the carrier, that is a red flag. A legitimate broker discloses the assigned carrier and explains the broker fee before you book.
When you check our records you'll find Enterprise Auto Transport, USDOT #2273104, MC #774106 — an owner-operated, federally licensed and bonded broker with offices in Naples, Florida and Minnesota. You can also read our full carrier vetting process.
A recent high-value vehicle theft made the rounds online this week, and the comments followed a familiar pattern. People blamed the load board, the auction, the broker, the carrier, and the platform. Everyone had a theory about where the breakdown happened.
I am not sure that specific case was a chain-of-custody problem. It may have been platform misuse, double-brokering, or a straight theft ring operating inside the marketplace. But the conversation around it points to something that is happening in a lot of cases, and most of the proposed solutions miss a larger point.
This post is about an idea I am actively developing into an application for my own brokerage clients. The goal is to address one slice of the fraud problem: identity and chain of custody.
A carrier can hold a legitimate DOT number, valid operating authority, and proper insurance. A driver can hold a valid CDL. And the wrong person can still show up in a customer's driveway with a truck and a story. The gap is not always the documents. Sometimes the gap is the connection between the documents and the human being standing in front of the vehicle.
The concept is simple. Every person who touches an order — the carrier, the dispatcher, the driver, and even the customer — should be verified through something like an ID.me-style identity check before any vehicle changes hands. A broker could use this same application when brokering loads to make sure the person taking possession is the person authorized to take possession.
Real verification should start with the actual motor carrier, tied to FMCSA registration as the authoritative source. This is not simply entering a DOT number into a form. The system needs to answer: who is this company, and who is actually authorized to represent it?
That single verified carrier identity becomes the root of every order that follows. If the root is solid, every downstream check becomes meaningful. If the root is weak, the rest of the chain collapses.
Carriers are not one person. An owner-operator may have a dispatcher, an operations manager, drivers, and employees. Each of those individuals should have their own verified account and credential inside the system, confirmed through an ID.me-style identity verification.
The owner should be able to add or remove employees instantly. If a driver leaves the company, their authorization dies with their account. No shared passwords, no generic logins, no employee pretending to be the owner. The system should always know exactly who is who and who is authorized to act for that carrier.
This is the same standard a broker could use when brokering a load. Before a carrier is assigned, every individual involved — the company representative and the assigned driver — has already passed an identity check.
In this proposed app, a carrier would not be verified once and then trusted forever. When an order is accepted, the carrier would assign the specific person responsible for the pickup. The order then shows a verified chain:
When the driver arrives, they authenticate through the app using a secure login, passkey, biometric, or ID.me-style identity verification. The system confirms: this is the verified person, they are still authorized by the carrier, they are assigned to this specific order, and the authorization is active at the time of pickup.
Only after that verification would the system generate a one-time pickup authorization. The credential is temporary and order-specific, so a stolen login or reused code cannot move a different vehicle.
For a broker using this application when brokering loads, this step is the difference between hoping the right carrier shows up and knowing it.
The customer should see a verified pickup authorization before handing over the keys. The customer and driver then complete a one-time verification match. If the person does not pass verification, the customer does not release the vehicle. If the carrier cannot verify the assigned person, the carrier does not receive the pickup authorization.
The customer-facing screen might show something like this:
Carrier vetting still matters. Background checks, insurance verification, and monitoring all have a place. But they are not enough on their own. We also need to ask how to verify every person involved in taking possession of a customer's vehicle, every single time.
A legitimate carrier identity is not enough. A legitimate driver's identity is not enough. The missing piece is the verified connection between the registered carrier, the authorized employee or driver, the specific order, and the actual vehicle being released.
The application I am building for my clients is designed around that standard. Brokers could use it when brokering loads to confirm that every individual in the chain — carrier representative, driver, and customer — has been verified before a vehicle is released.
No ID.me-style verification. No authorization. No vehicle. That is the standard that could move the needle on a large slice of auto transport fraud. It is an idea I am actively working on, not just thinking about.
Key takeaways
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